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Throughout his 1ife， Lawrence is preoccupied by the human action 
called “knowing." In Fantasia of the Unconscious he proc1aims quite de-
finite1y:“The fina1 aim is not to know， but to be. Th巴renever was a 
more risky motto than that: J(110W thyself .… You've got to know your-
self so that you can at 1east be yourself. ‘Be yourse1f' is the 1ast motto" 
(FU 68). And this motto is untiring1y supported by his 1ife-1ong asser-
tion that b100d consciousness is m01・eessentia1 than menta1 conscious-
ness. This assertion has a variation from time to time， but the essence 
of his message is: man has an innate core of being which he calls the 
"naive core，" but over the tim巴 thiscore is cumu1ative1y covered， and 
eventually dominated， by man's 1ater attainment of intellect， and this 
phenomenon has overturned the origina1 ba1anc巴 thatman once had: 
henc巴 thepresent human ai1ment of self-consciousness and the 10ss of 
spon tanei ty. もiVhatwe need to do， then， isto recover this ba1ance. -1 
think the premise of his assertion needs reconsideration. What does he 
mean by saying that b100d consciousness is dominated by menta1 con-
sciousness? And if it is， isthis such an abominab1e thing as he 
asserts? The essentia1 question is wheth巴rLawrence's dichotomy of 
menta1 consciousness and b100d consciousness， as well as that of“to 
know" and “to be，" are stil va1id. 
His criticism of mind or menta1 consciousness often takes a radica1 
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fo1'm， such as:“The body of itself is clean， but the caged mind / is a 
sewer inside， itpollutes .." (“Obscenity，" CP 463)， 01'，“Sex isn't sin， ah 
no! sex isn't sin， / nor is it dirty， not until the dirty mind pokes in" 
(“Sex Isn't Sin，" CP 463)， 01' yet again，“o you c1'eatures of mind， don't 
touch me!" (“Noli Me Tangere，" CP 468)，01'“That my body need not be / 
fingered by the mind" (“Chastity，" CP 469). 01' even mo1'e candidly: 
“When the mind makes a wheel which turns on the hub of the ego / and 
the will， the living dynamo， gives the motion and the speed / and the 
whe巴1of conscious self spins on its absolution， absolute / absolute . 
absolute consciousness …absolute self-awa1'eness …then we see evil， 
pure evil / and we see it only in man…" (“What Then is Evil?" CP 712). 
In thes巴poeticexp1'essions he could make his view st1'aightforward and 
even emotional， but in explanato1'Y discourse he is more sober. 
H巴saysthat man has two modes of knowing，“blood-knowledge" and 
“mind-knowledge，" the former being primordial.“Blood-knowledge， in-
stinct， intuition， al the vast flux of knowing that goes on in the da1'k， 
antecedent to the mind. / Then cam巴 thatbeastly apple， and the other 
sort of knowledg巴started.… Thus start KNOWING which sho1'tly 1'uns 
to UNDERSTANDlNG， when the devil gets his own." Why is “mind-
knowledge" 01'“KNOWING" so evil? B巴caus巴“mind-consciousnessex-
tinguishes blood-consciousness， and consumes the blood." Law1'ence， 
viewing this way， takes side with the autho1's of the Old Testament: 
“They [Adam and Eve] wanted to KNOW. And that was the bi1'th of 
sm … No wond巴l' the Lord kicked them out of the garden. Dirty 
hypocrites." Why are they? Because by desiring to know， they began 
to watch themselves， and th巴“sin was the self-watching， self 
consciousness. The sin， and th巴 doom. Dirty understanding" (SCAL 
82). He b巴comeseven more dogmatic in saying:“To know a living thing 
is to kil it" (70). 
We should not be perplexed by his rhetorically antagonistic asser-
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tion， and try to distinguish the genuine from emotional hyperbole， The 
most significant point he makes is that there are two modes of knowing. 
He is so upset by the human predicam巴nt，one of its chief aspects being 
the overwh巴lming“development"of mental consciousness. This con 
tains an important， and maybe even correct， diagnosis， but a correct di 
agnosis does not necessarily guarantee the effectiveness of the antidote. 
What we need is an integral view of “knowing" and consciousness. 
I 
To show how mental consciousness functions， or dysfunctions， Lawr-
ence tak巴san巴xampleof a child in the bath. He visually describes 
how the child can't help acting on his ideas and he rubs the soap into 
his eyes and sucks it and becomes unhappy. 
. Why? To see the soap and to want it is a natural act on the part 
of any young animal， a sign of that wonderful naive curiosity which 
is so beautiful in young life. But the “he won't be happy til he gets 
it" quality is， alas， pu1'ely human. A young animal， ifdiverted， 
would fo1'get the piec巴ofsoap at once. It is only an accident in his 
ho1'izon. 01'， given the piece of soap， he would sniff it， perhaps tUl・n
it over， and then merely abandon it. Beautiful to us is the pure 
nonchalance of a young animal which jorgets the piece of soap the 
moment it has sniffed it and found it no good. Only the intelligent 
human baby p1'oceeds to fil its mouth， stomach， and eyes with acute 
pain， on account of the piece of soap. -Why? B巴causethe poor 
litle wretch got an idea， an incipient idea into his litle head， The 
rabbit never gets an idea into its head， so it can sniff the soap and 
turn away. But a human baby， poor， tormented litle creatUl・e，can't 
helt acting on his idea: no matter what the consequenc巴s. -And 
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this bit of soap shows us what a bitter 1・esponsibilityour mental 
consciousness is to us … 
. At least， education and growing-up is supposed to be a process 
of learning to escap巴theautomatIsm of ideas， tolive direct from the 
spontaneous， vital centre of oneself. 
Anyhow， itis criminal to expect children to“express themselves" 
and to bring themselves up. They will eat the soap and pour the 
treacle ov巴rtheir hair and put theI1・ fingersin the candle-flame， in 
the acts of physical self-expression， and in the wildness of spiritual 
S巴lf-expressionthey will just go to piec巴s. A1I because， rea1ly， th巴y
have enough mental intellig巴nceto obliterate th巴irinstinctive inte1li 
gence and to send them to destruction…・ Thism巴ntalconscious 
ness we are born with is the most double-edged blessing of a1l， and 
grown-ups must spend years and years guarding their children from 
disastI・ouseffects of this blessing. (“Education of the People，" RDP 
104-5) 
Though the dichotomy is we1l depicted， one cannot巴rasecompletely 
some doubts， some suspicion of intricate rhetorical sophistry， especia1ly 
in the comparison between human mental consciousness and animal“l1l 
stinctiv巴inte1ligence，"stressing that the former is miserable and the lat 
ter beautiful. What makes us feel this discussion somewhat unfair is 
his neglect to acknowledge the positive aspects of mental consciousness. 
These aspects include logical thinking and the self-reflective function 
which enables man to take the role of other， hence his ability to sym-
pathize， empathize， and have compassion. At one point Lawrence ack-
nowledges that mental consciousness is a “bitter 1・巴sponsibility"and the 
“most double-edged blessing of a1l，" which sounds very true， but he im-
mediately jumps to the bold assertion that mental consciousness 
obliterates the“instinctive intelligence." In other words， he does not 
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seem to acknowledge that this mental consciousness is an essential and 
indispensable step towa1'd t1'anscendence to a highe1' level of being， 
which is his own goal. 
Tru巴， he admits in the same essay:吋九Tedon't find fault with the 
mental consciousness， the daylight consciousness of mankind. Not at 
all. We only find fault with the One-and Allness which is at1'ibuted to 
it" (136). But is this t1'ue? Has mankind 1'eally made it“One-and-All，" 
oblite1'ating blood consciousness? It is certainly true that there is the 
“automatism of ideas" in man: we tend to act upon almost any kinds of 
ideas whenever we are intrigued. It must be ou1' common feeling that it 
is ve1'y difficult to escape f1'om this so1't of temptation of ideas. But 
this p1'aise of animal nonchalance because of th巴 S巴emingabsence of 
mental consciousness confuses the matte1': it confuses epistemology and 
aesthetics. 
To counte1'balance， itwould be useful to 1'efe1' to some scientists who 
exp1'巴ssthat mental， 01' scientific understanding and the sense of beauty， 
01' wonde1'， do not collide. Stephen J. Gould assures that th巴ycan coex-
ist， saying:“Both the sense of wonde1' and the intellectual knowledge 
should be cu1tivated with g1'eat care. Would we app1'eciate the beauty 
of nature less if the ha1'mony of natu1'e isnot designed by God in adv-
ance? Wouldn't ou1' mind have a sense of wonde1' or fear if billions of 
brain cells reside in our cranium?" (36). Paul Davies， British physicist， 
says in a similar tone:“Both religion and science creates in man a sort 
of awe， a queer mixed feelings of humility and arrogance. All the gr巴at
scientists have been moved by the beauty and mystery of the wo1'ld 
which they wanted to understand" (319). Richard Dawkins also empha 
sizes that scientific investigation provokes meaning and sense of wonder 
in man， saying:“… the spirit of wonder which led Blake to Christian 
mysticism， Keats to Arcadian myth and Yeats to Fenians and fai1'ies， is
the very sam巴 spiritthat moves g1'eat scientists; a spi1'it which， if fed 
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back to poets in scientific guise， might inspire stil greater poetry" (Un 
weav仰gthe Rainbow 27). From this perspective， he comments on Lawr-
ence， saying that his “poem about hummingbirds is almost wholly in-
accurate and therefore， superficially， unscientific … A large obstacle 
would have been Lawrenc巴'shostility to what he wrongly thought of as 
the anti-poetic science and scientists …"(25). How， then， did Lawrence 
“wrongly" think?:“But the very idea of taking animals to be role mod-
els， as in the bestiaries， isa piece of bad poetic science. Animals are 
not there to be role models， they are there to surviv巴 andreproduce" 
(211). This is somewhat similar to what Auden contends when he says: 
“Here Lawrence draws a false analogy between the process of artistic 
cr巴ationand the organic growth of living creatures" (283). Dawkins 
and Auden both point out the confusion of the different spheres of 
knowledge. Lawrence must have hated these criticisms， and yet they 
would shed an interesting light on his treatment of “knowing." 
Another example of his view of mental consciousness and blood con-
sciousness is in the preface to Fred巴rickCarter's The Dragon 01 the Ato-
calytse， where he concedes the function of mental consciousness， saying: 
. itis not Reason herself whom we have to defy， itis her myrmidons， 
our accepted ideas and thought-forms" (P 297). This is exactly why he 
faces the dilemma between accepting the“truth" of the “pock-marked 
horror of the scientific photographs of the moon" and clinging to， or in-
sisting on the imaginative “truth" of th巴“whitewonder of the skies， so 
rounded， so velvety， moving so serene." His strategy to defend the im-
aginative truth is the ful use of human imagination produced by blood 
consciousness， for which only ancient astrological symbols are n巴ces-
sary:“Hints， we have only hints from the outsid巴 Butthe rest is with-
in us， and if we can take a hint， itis extraordinary how far and into 
what fascinating worlds the hints can lead us. The orthodox critics 
will say: Fantasy! Nothing but fantasy! But then， thank God for fan-
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tasy， ifit enhances our 1ザe"(303， my italics). Here we can see clearly 
how Law1'ence's epistemology works， whe1'e intellectual knowledge must 
be subse1'vient to the aesthetics which a1'e governed by blood conscious 
ness. Why? Becaus巴whatis of paramount importance to Lawrence is 
how to“自lhanc巴ourlife，" how to fel t1'uly alive in meaningful ways， 
and mental consciousness has its me1'its and mison d'etre only if and 
when it helps it. And that is why he appreciates so much the astrolo-
gical symbols Ca1'te1' is talking about:“… the sense of ast1'onomical 
space me1'ely paralys巴sme. But the sense of living ast1'ological 
heavens gives me an extensIon of 1ザ being，1 become big αnd glittering and 
vast 1IJith a SUl1ψtU01将叩stness. 1 am the Mac1'Ocosm，α:nd it ゐ1IJonde1ful"
(293， my italics). 
This dichotomizing view of consciousness such as LaW1'ence's is 
widely seen in the Romantic tradition whe1'e they have 1'eacted against 
va1'ious kinds of mind -ori巴nt巴dwo1'ldview， The cur1'ent question， 
the1'efo1'e， can be pa1'aph1'ased as: how can we 1'econcile the two dif-
ferent， and often antagonistic， wo1'ldviews. 
Ken Wilber's view sheds an impo1'tant light on this question: in his 
“integ1'al" view， m巴ntalconsciousness and blood consciousness a1'e neve1' 
antagonistic. He introduces the idea of ‘'four quad1'ants，" 01' “four faces 
of t1'uth." To be mo1'e p1'巴cise，he divides the appl・oachesof th巴“human
knowledg巴 quest"in the histo1'Y into fou1' pa1'ts 01'“quadrants，" acco1'd-
ing to th巴 app1'oachesof “interior" and “exte1'io1'，" and “individual" and 
“collective，" naming them 1・espectiv巴ly:interio1'-individual“intentional，" 
inte1'ior -collecti ve “cultu1'al，"巴xte1'io1'-individual “behavioral，" and 
exte1'io1'-collective “social." Some might find this c1assification arbit-
1'a1'Y， but the point he1'e is how he views the situation. He says that 
each a1'ea 01' quad1'ant is "equally significant and impo1'tant" (ES 5)， and， 
because “they each have a d1'astically diffe1'ent phenomenology，"“neithe1' 
can be 1'educed to othe1' without remaind巴r"(1). He also says that 
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each of these quadrants“has its own particular type of truth 01・typeof 
‘validity claims，'" and therefore:“to say that none of these quadrants 
can be reduced to th巴 othersis to say that none of their respective 
truths can be dismissed or 1・巴duced，eithe1'' (12). 
As for the Romantic view， having admitted that “… the 'official' and 
most widespread worldview of the modern West is that of scientific 
materialism，" Wilber points out that“it will do no good， as Romantics 
wish， to attempt to 1'eturn to yesteryear， an attempt to‘1'esurrect' the 
past with a ‘1'esurgence of the r巴al:for modernity b1'ought its own im-
portant truths and p1'ofound insights， which need to be harmonized as 
、vel;and yesteryear， ful truth be told， just wasn't al that swell" (IP 
55-6). 
Though occasionally asserting that he never“attempts to return to 
yest巴ryear，"Lawrence nevertheless tries to“resurrect" the past with a 
“r巴surgenceof th巴real，"and exp1'esses 1'adical doubts on the view that 
“modernity b1'ought its own important truths and profound insights." 
This contention 01' denial of the positive aspects of modernity is brought 
about by his deep-rooted suspicion of the function of m巴ntal conscious-
ness or reason. Seeing the WOl・ldthrough reason or rationality is 
usually considered to be born in the European Renaissance， and rein 
forced in the following periods of Scientific Revolution and Enlighten-
ment， the pivotal figu1'es being Francis Bacon， Descartes，丘ndNewton: 
h巴ncethe common phrase“Desca1'tes-Newtonian worldview." And this 
is the main target of the c1'iticism of the Romantics. 
This Wilbe1"s idea would make it easier for us to see the character-
istics of Lawrence's view. In stressing the impo1'tance and significance 
of blood consciousness， Law1'ence tires to r巴ducethe quadrant of mental 
consciousness to that of blood consciousness. They have theIl縄 own
sp巴cificfield where their faculty is designed to work in it. In this 1'e 
spect what Law1'ence and Wilbel‘say or declare is both“true." A hu-
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man baby， as Lawrence tactfu11y depicts，“can't help acting on his idea，" 
but it is nothing to lament ov巴r:it is the right function of m巴ntalcon-
sciousness， as far as it is aware of its sphere to function. It is， indeed， 
“th巴mostdouble-edged blessing of a1，" and that is why it is so impor 
tant to know the both “edges." 
So far Lawrence points out correctly at least th巴on巴“edge，"the 
negative one， of the “blessing." But here， typica11y， he jumps from ack-
nowledging mental consciousness as “a bitter responsibility" to denounc-
ing it as“ou1' g1'eat pe1'il，" by cont1'asting， 1'athe1' erroneously as Auden 
points out， mental consciousness with the beauty of“the pu1'e noncha-
lance of a young animal. Again， the point we should not miss is that 
what mental consciousness does cannot be reduced to the sphere where 
blood consciousness controls 01' dominates. In this sense， the baby's 
“he won't be happy ti1 he gets it" quality is a meaningful one. It is the 
destiny of the“poor litle wretch" to get an idea into his litle head， and 
learn through this experience. No use lamenting over the fact that“the 
rabbit never gets an idea into its head." This is the way which Wilber 
ca11s “hono1' and incorporate" (ES， 12)， 01'“t1'anscend and include." 
What we should do， according to him， isto integ1'at巴 bothsphe1'es 01・
"validity claims，" not to p1'onounce the dominance of the one over the 
other. 
Wilber summa1'izes the Romantic view as fo11ows:“… one starts out 
in unconscious Heaven， an unconscious union with the Divine; one then 
loses this unconscious union， and thus plung巴sinto conscious Hell; one 
can then regain the Divine union， but now in a higher and conscious 
fashion" (ES 53). One can see that Lawr官 lcewould not ag1'e巴withthis 
view. This is rather the position that Blake， a unique Romantic in this 
respect， tool王， who said:“Unorganized Innocenc巴， An Impossibility / In-
nocence dwe11s with Wisdom but n巴verwith Ignorance" (697). Wilb巴1・
then says that“the course of human development - and evolution at 
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large -is f1'om subconscious to self-conscious to supe1'conscious; f1'om 
p1'epe1'sonal to pe1'sonal to t1'anspe1'sonal; f1'om unde1'-mental to m巴ntal
to ove1'-mental ." Then he concludes:“The Romantics had simply con-
fused p1'e with t1'ans， and thus elevated the p1'e states to the glory of the 
t1'ans ." (5). This is exactly why he p1'oclaims that “the actual state 
of the infantile self [is] unconscious Hel!" (53). 
II 
On the basis of the preceding discussion， let us 1'econside1' Law-
1'ence's view of “knowing." He would ag1'ee with Wilb巴1"sview that the 
state of the infant is “subconscious，"“p1'epe1'sonal，" and “unde1'-mental，" 
but he ce1'tainly would not ag1'ee with viewing this state as inferior. 
He keeps p1'aising the beauty of animal's nonchalance and describes hu-
man baby de1'ogato1'ily because he has mental consciousness. But 
obviously th巴 humanbaby has less m巴ntalconsciousness than the 
grown ups， and in this 1'espect he is better off. The human baby or in-
fant has the same“double-edged blessing" as adults， but he stil has pos-
sibility of making good use of it -how feeble the possibility might be. 
Law1'ence is sometimes ve1'y explicit on this point. He makes Bi1'kin 
decla1'e“b1'utal!y" that man is not spontaneous川 Notbecause they have 
too much mind， but too litle'" (41). But this is one of 1'elatively fewe1' 
statements Law1'ence makes. Gene1'ally he points out and criticizes the 
negative side of the“double-edged blessing." 
What has become clea1'er is how Law1'ence pe1'ceives being “cons-
cious" 01' “awar・e." To him， itis mostly the job of mental consciousness， 
not blood consciousness， and that is the premise of his c1'iticism. Wil 
be1'， on the othe1' hand， though s巴eingthe situation in the same way， in 
terp1'ets it as a n巴cessarystep， because "the actual course of human 
ontog巴ny"is “f1'om unconscious Hel! to conscious Hel! to conscious 
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Heaven." In ord巴l'to get to the fina1 step， one has to go through the 
step of“conscious Hell" which is 1arge1y mind-ridden， and “there it [the 
se1f] may spend its entire life" (ES 54). This reminds us that in Zen 
m巴ditationit is said the meditator shou1d go through “Makyo" (Evil 
Sphere) in order to get to “satori" or the fina1 enlightenment. Wi1ber 
emphasizes the importance of this step because the fina1. destination is 
“conscious" Heaven， not “unconscious." Lawrence never determined his 
stance on this issue. In fact， his statements vacillate vast1y from:“It 
seems as if the great aim and purpose in human 1ife were to bring al 
life into the human consciousness. And this is the fina1 meaning of 
work: the extension of human consciousness" (P 430-31)， 01':“Man is a 
great venture in consciousness" (P 731)， 01':“Any man of rea1 individua1-
ity tries to know and to understand what is happening， even in himself， 
as he goes a1ong， This strugg1e for verba1 consciousness shou1d not be 
1eft out in aI・t. It is a v巴rygreat part of life. It is not superimposition 
of a theory. Itis the tassionate struggleinto conscious being" (WL 486)， 
to:“The moment the human being becomes conscious of himself， he 
ceases to be himse1f" (P 761)， 01' “The sin was the self-watching self-
consciousness. The sin， and the doom. Dirty UNDERST ANDING. 
(SCAL 82)， 01':“KNOWING and BEING are opposite， antagonistic states. 
The more you know， exact1y， the 1ess you are. The more you are， the 
1ess you KNOW" (106). 
As we have discussed， especially in the 1ight of Wi1ber's“all-1eve1， 
al1-quadrant approach，"“to know" and “to be" are not antagonistic: 
rather they are in the re1ationship of what Wi1ber calls “transcend and 
inc1ude." His idea is based on the ful awareness of the“vice" of mod-
er・nitywhich he 1ists:“the death of God， the death of Goddess， the com-
modification of 1ife， the 1eve1ing of qualitative distinctions， the brutali-
ties of capita1ism， the rep1acement of qua1ity by quantity， the 10ss of 
va1ue and meaning， the fragm巴ntationof th巴1ifeworld，existentia1 dread， 
、 、?，???
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polluting industrialization， a rampant and vulgar materialism -al of 
which have often been summal包edin the phrase made famous by Max 
Weber:‘the disenchantment of th巴 world.'"This list of the“vice" of 
modernity， however， isimmediately counterbalanced by its “virtues" 01' 
“immensely positive aspects of modelゴlIsm"which “also gave us the 
liberal democracies; the ideals of equality， freedom， and justice， regard 
less of race， c1ass， creed， 01‘gender; mod巴rnmedicine， physics， biology， 
and chemistry; the end of slavery; the rise of feminism; and the univer-
sal rights of humankind" (IP 59). His contention is to integrate， 01' 
“transcend and inc1ude，" the two opposing aspects in historical perspec-
tive. Referring to“various scholars， from Max Weber to Jurgen Haber-
mas，" he says that“what specifically defined modernity was som巴thing
called‘the diffel・entiationof the cultural value spheres，' which specially 
means the differentiation of art， morals， and science" (60). In the pre 
modern time， these spheres were not c1early differentiated， and that is 
why Galileo， for example， could not publish his own discoveries because 
the church dominated "art， morals， and science." After this differentia-
tion， scienc巴wasliberated to pursue its own goal， hence al the “vices." 
But， Wilber continues， the“‘bad news' of modernity was that these 
value spheres did not just peacefully separate， they often flew apart 
compl巴tely. The wonderful d的Cerentiationsof modernity went too far 
into actual dissoC'Iation， fragm巴ntation，alienation" (61). The Romantics 
are those who see this differentiation as dissociation， and this serves 
the basis of their dichotomized worldview， in which they “divided the 
world into Being versus ego. Anything that was ego (01' rational， or 
analytical， 01' conceptual， or personal， or linear) was viewed as ‘bad，' 
and ωtything else -anything that lacked ego -was thought to be God， 
or Ground， or Glory" (ES 368). Lawrence's dichotomized view is essen-
tial1y of the same nature. 
Charles Taylor sees the current human situation in similar t巴rms:
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There are people who look on the coming of technological cIvilization 
as a kind of unmitigated decline. We have lost the contact with the 
earth and its rhythms that our ancestors had. We have lost contact 
with ourselves， and our own natural being， and are driven by an im-
perative of domination that condemns us to ceaseless battle against 
nature both within and around us. This complaint against th巴
“disenchantment" of the world has been articulated again and again 
since the Romantic p巴riod，with its sharp s巴nsethat human beings 
had been triply divided by modern reason -within themselves， be-
tween themselves， and from the natural world. (94) 
His view of the current human predicament is essentially the same as 
that of Lawrence's and Wilber's. On this premise， however・， he goes on 
to say that“part of what is going for instrumental reason is that it 
enables us to control our environment，" and he adds “two other impor-
tant contexts …from which the stress on instrumental reason has 
arisen." They are: 1: Seeing ours巴lvesas disengaged reason gives us “a 
moral ideal， that of a self-responsible， self-controlling reasoning，" and 2: 
the “affirmation of ordinary life …has made us give unprecedented im-
portanc巴 tothe production of the conditions of life in ever-greater 
abundance and the relief of suffering on an ever¥wider scale" (103-4). 
This latter point is articulated in more straightforward way by Daw 
kins. Endorsing Carl Sagan's phrase:“1 don't think at the guts (by in 
stinct)" (A Devil's Chatlain 58)， he asserts:“1司Teare the apes which have 
evolved tremendously， and our brain is designed solely for understand-
ing petty worldly things in order to survive in the African savanna in 
the Stone Age" (85). Such a view is often denounced as reductionist， 
but his essential statement shares some points with that of Taylor's and 
Wilber's: mental consciousness or instrumental reason has developed or 
evolved in order to survive， and then to make our life better and more 
???
?
?
?
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comfortable. They a1 stl・essthe in巴vitabilityof such development. 
The vital difference Dawkins shows is his complete reductionist view， 
epitomized in the phrase“designed solely for." Taylor and Wilber 
admit that instrumental reason has developed inevitably， but they do 
not think that it is the sole reason. 
What Lawrence， then， overlooks is the inevitability of th巴evolution
ary process of human development. Wilber's criticism of th巴“New
Age" thinkers， who are in a way h巴irsof Lawrence， could be applicable 
to Lawrence: 
many p巴ople[in humanistic I transpersonal circ1es] confuse the 
wal'mth and hea1't-expanse of postconv巴ntionalawareness with the 
merely subjective feelings of the s巴nso1'ybody， and， caught in this 
p1'e/post fa11acy， recommend merely bodywo1'k for high巴l'emotional 
expansion， when what is also 1'equi1'ed is postfo1'mal cognitive 
growth， not simply p1'eformal cognitive immersion. Obviously body-
work has an important and fundamental role to play in g1'owth and 
therapy， but the elevation of prefo1'mal sensations to postfo1'mal love 
has caused endless p1'oblems in the human potential movement. (IP 
120) 
Of course what Lawrence describes，巴speciallythe description of sexual 
encounter， is not a me1'e “preformal cognitive immersion" 01' “preformal 
sensations." On the contrary， he tries ha1'd to make c1ea1' that those 
“genuin巴"sexual contacts take place in the t1'anscendental sphe1'e. An 
obvious example is the one between Ursula and Birkin in the “Excu1'se" 
chapter of Women in Love， and another is the ones in Lady Chαtel'ley's 
Lovel'. 
In the latte1'， sexual contacts of Connie and Mello1's are attempts to 
describe genuine human relationship through， to use Wilb巴1"sterm， the 
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“巴yeof Spirit，" that is， the at巴mptto represent spiritual reality app巴ars
in the physical realm. Lawrence attempts to show that something fun-
damentally different happens in and aftel・ theideal sexual encounter， 
that is， some mysterious transformation occurs superficially in the 
realm of body， but in reality it occurs in the realm of spirit. 
His effort is， tosome deep-reading readers， obvious enough， but the 
general reader is apt to take it as som巴thinglike“resurrection of the 
body" or“body should be over mind" sort of philosophy. Lawrence is 
partly to blame for this type of reading; his emphasis on blood con 
sciousness over mental consciousness being one of the major reasons. 
By this emphasis， he in a way reverses the importance: it is the import-
ance of Spirit which he tries to show， but he is very often taken as a 
proclaimer or advocate of the“resurrection of the body." And indeed 
he sometimes seems to believe wholeheartedly in the importance of the 
latter. His praise of the realm of body or， to use Wilber's terms，“sen-
sibilia" and critique of the realm of mind or“intelligibi1ia" are from time 
to time overwhelming. At times his reverence for the Holy Ghost and 
its various products， such as “star-equilibrium" or“otherness" or“chas 
tity，" to name a few， isglorified ov巴rthe body. This shift or vacilla-
tion of emphasis confuses the reader， and this most likely reflects Law-
rence's own confusion. He very obviously seeks the possibility of 
巴mergingthe r巴almsof“transcendelia" through the mysterious relation 
of man and woman， often in the case of sexual intercourse， guided by 
the Holy Ghost， inthe realm of “sensibilia." But h巴moreoften than not 
fails to make the following clear enough: the body or“S巴nsibilia"is the 
ground through and on which "transcend巴lia"opens up wh巴1・esome 
mystical phenomena take place， and it is not something to“resurrect" 
over the mind. 
It is ironic that while Lawrence wants to show the realm of Spirit， 
how it loolcs if one s巴巴sthe cosmos through the “巴yeof Spirit，" he con-
、 、 ， ?? ? ?????、 、 282 
verts the direction toward the flesh. When Lady Chatterley first sees 
Mellors washing himself， itis a visionary experience:“it had hit her in 
the middle of her body" (6). It is her Spirit that perceives the scene 
as “visionary." Her mental consciousness tries to degrade the experi-
ence， tel1ing her that it is “merely a man washing himself! Common-
place enough， heaven knows." But her Spirit knows the truth -it is a 
visionary experience. True， itis “merely" his body she watches， but in 
r巴alityshe sees it， or the whole scene for that matter， through her“eye 
of Spirit." The experience is so rar巴and，above al， disturbs her ev-
eryday mental consciousness which revolts and rej巴ctsthe vision. But 
the point is not that she sees it through her blood consciousness， but 
hel・“eyeof Spirit." Obviously Lawrence uses th巴formerto signify the 
latter. But since“blood" connotes the flesh so strongly， his intention is， 
without his notice， revert巴dtoward the dir巴ctionof the flesh， not the 
Spirit. H巴isso hasty in going on the attack of“mental life" typified by 
Clifford and his Cambridg巴friends，and that hastiness its巴lfforcefully 
takes him into the praise of blood and the flesh， which， again， betrays 
his intention. 
IV 
1 say “betray" because his philosophy at one level clearly grasps the 
core of the issue. In an often-quoted passage from“Introduction to 
These Paintings，" h巴againsoberly states:“The true great discoveries of 
science and real works of art are made by the whole consciousness of 
man working together in unison and oneness: instinct， intuition， mind， 
intellect al fused into one complete consciousness， and grasping what 
we may call a complete truth， or a complete vision， a complete revela-
tion in sound" (P 573-74). His goal is to attain this “complete con-
sciousness" which necessitat巴sthe fusion of instinct and mind， 01' blood 
281 ( 16) 
To Know， orTo Be， That is the Question: D. H. Lawrence's“Blod Consciousnes" and ι'~Iental Consciousnes" Reconsidered 
consciousness and m巴ntalconsciousness. The whole problem of Lawr-
ence is that this clear-cut awareness is less embodied in his works， both 
cr巴ativeand discursive， than is expected. That is， despite sporadic ex-
pressions of such awareness， far more weight is placed on the import 
ance， and hence recovery， ofthe flesh and blood consciousness. 
In the same essay he says: 
The mind and spirit alone can never really grasp a work of art， 
though they may， in a masturbating fashion， provoke the body into 
an ecstasized response. The ecstasy will die out into ash and more 
ash. And the l'巴asonwe have so many trivial scientists promulgat-
ing fantastic “facts" is that so many modern scientists likewise work 
with the mind alone， and force the intuitions and instincts into a 
prostituted acquiescence. The very statement that water is H20 is 
a mental tour de force. With our bodies w巴knowthat water is 10t 
H20， our intuitions and instincts both know it is not so. But they 
are bullied by the impudent mind. (574) 
This is very true: the only thing he overlooks is that there are various 
modes of knowing including th巴onethat sees water as “H20，" which is 
also true in its own “quadrant." Mental knowledge is another authentic 
mode of knowledge which has its own merits and limits. The problem 
occurs when one of them starts to assert that it is the only true mod巴of
knowing. Paul Davi巴ssays:“In the case of organic body， no one denies 
that its organs consist of atoms. The mistake is to think that they are 
nothing but the conglomerat巴 ofatoms" (84). 01' Douglas Hofstadter 
adroitly puts it:“It is wrong to ask in which way we should understand 
the world， holistically 01' reductively. It depends on what you want to 
know" (qtd. in Davies， 86)目IlyaP1'igogine and Isab巴leStenge1's also 
express the same view:“It is possibl巴toexpress one system in various 
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languages and viewpoints， but th巴ya1'e complem巴nta1'y. They a1 deal 
with one 1'ea1ity， but it is impossible to 1'educe them to a single dis-
cou1'se. The fact that the1'e a1'e multiple views which a1'e i1'1'educible to 
each other means that there can be no such thing as God's view which 
sees the 1'eality as a whol巴"(298…9). A1'tistic， aesthetic， scientific， sub 
j巴ctive，objectiv巴-a1 these modes of knowing are true， but only in 
their quad1'ants. Once one of them intrudes its view upon the others， 
insisting that it the only true one (“God's view")， confusion sets in. 
Law1'ence deeply penet1'ates this complicated condition concerning hu-
man “lmowing": in fact his life-long effo1'ts set out to settle the confusion 
by 1'ecove1'ing the original balance. But in its course， he puts too much 
weight on the side of“intuitions and instincts，" which upsets the ba-
lance to the opposite direction. 
Graham Hough says that “integration 01' balance of forces…for him 
is the key to the whole vital process，" and then:“neither can it [the 1・e-
conciliation] be achieved by giving the victOlγto the Flesh and a110wing 
it to lead the Spirit captive -a procedure of which Lawrence is often 
accused" (227). My discussion may seem another attempt of accusation， 
but my whole point is that Lawrence's c1ea1' awareness that“integration 
and balance is the key" unfortunately comes only spasmodica11y and is 
thus not fu11y developed and embodied in his treatment of “to know" and 
“to be." As Donald Gutierrez points out， on the contrary to the com 
mon view， itwould be correct to ca11 him a “monist" rather than a 
“dualist" (qtd. in Montgomery 15)， fo1' he understands， 01' at least 
notices， the complex 1'elation of duality and t1'inity. In the trinity the 
thi1'd powe1' 1'econciles the two opposing forces so that duality virtua11y 
dissipates， but the polarity remains since it is the essential basis of trin-
ity. Lawrence， however， continu巴sto see the situation in a dual way 
and does not seem to understand the dynamism w巴1enough to give both 
blood consciousness and mental consciousness their due. For him，“to 
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know" and “to be" remain antagonistic states， never reconciling. Robert 
Montgomery states that because of the“difficulty…in the inability of 
the human intellect and of language to grasp a relation in which the 
three are one， the one is three，" the “emphasis swings irresistibly from 
one aspect to its counterpart …never able except at moments to hold the 
two in balance" (17). This apt1y explains the difficulty Lawrence was 
trapp巴din. But his most essential difficu1ty seems to lie in his Roman-
tic inclination. His life-Iong hatred and reaction against the over-
whelming tide of the age -positivism， scientism， reductionism， indus-
trialism， mater局ialism，the death of God， the loss of value and meaning -
urges him to vacillate between the c1ear vision and the "reactionism，" 
and that vacillation ultimately blurs his vision and disturbs the efforts 
toward real integration of “to know" and “to be." 
Works Cited 
Auden， W. H. The Dyel"s H，日Ild.London: Fabe!・&Faber， 1962. 
Blake， ¥司1illiam.The Complete Poet1y & Pl'ose 01 William Blake. Ed. David V. Erd 
man. New York: Doubleday， 1988 
Davies， Paul. God and the New Phグ'sics.Trans. Morikazu Toda. Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten， 1994. 
Dawkins， Richard. A Devil's ChaPlail. Trans. Yuji Tarumi. Tokyo: Hayakawa 
Shobo， 2004. 
Unweaving the Rainbow: Sciellce， Del1tsion and t/ze Appetite 101' Wondel'， Bos-
ton: Houghton Mifflin， 1998. 
Gould， Stephen Jay. Ever Since Dal'wi1l. Trans. Masanori Uramoto and Hiroshi 
Terada. Tokyo: Hayakawa Shobo， 1995 
Hough， Graham. The Dal'k 51tn: A Study 01 D. H. Lawrellce. New York: Octagon 
Books， 1979. 
Lawrence， D. H. The Comtlete Poems 01 D. H. Lawrellce. Ed. V目 deSola Pinto and 
Warren Roberts. New York: Viking， 1971. (CP) 
一一.L日dyChatterley's Lover. Ed. Michael Squires. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Pr巴s，1993. (LCL) 
一一一.Phoenix. Ed. E. D. McDonald. Harmondsworth: Penguin， 1978. (P) 
( 19) 278 
.F.日1ηIt，的日siω日01 tl!e UI日ICOI口Isciω!OlS0.ω1ηId Ps勾:ychω00.ω1Iω日ly.別 s(日1/日Idtl!e UI口ICOIηIsciolS.Ha1 
mondsworth: Penguin， 1971. (FU) 
Reflectiolls 011 tl!e Dea.th 01 0. POI"ClψIne日ndOtl!er Essロys.Ed. Michael Her 
bel・t.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press， 1988. (RDJう
一一一.Stltdies in Classic A lIleriCall Litemtul官.Ed. Ezra Gl巴enspan，Lindeth Vasey， 
and John Worthen. Cambl・idge:Cambridge Univel・sityPress， 2004. (SCAL) 
一一一• WOl/lel in Love. Ed. David Farmer， Lindeth Vasey， and John Vlorthen. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Pr巴ss，1987. (WL) 
Montgomery， Robert E. Tl!e Visiolla./)' D. H. Lawrellce: Beyolld Philosophy a.nd Art. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press， 1994. 
Prigogine， Ilya and Stengers， Isabelle. Order Ont 01 Cl!aos. Trans. Koji Fushimi， 
Yuzur・uFushimi and Hideaki Matsueda. Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo， 1987 
Taylor， Charl芭s.Tlw Ethics 01 Authellticity. Cambridge，恥Ias.and London: Har 
vard University Press， 1991. 
Wilber， Ken. Tl!e Eye 01 SpI:rit: An Integml Vision 101' 0. World GOlle Slightly M，日d.
Boston and London: Shambhala， 1998目 (ES)
一一 IntegmlPsycl!ology: COllsciousness， Spirit， Psycl!ology， Tl!erapy. Boston and 
London: Shambhala， 2000. (IP) 
277 (20 ) 
